Kamal Ghorui
China has once again released a list of Chinese names for places in Arunachal Pradesh, which it refers to as Zangnan (South Tibet), as part of its territorial claims. The latest batch reportedly covers around 23 locations. This is not an isolated move; such renaming exercises have been ongoing since 2006, when China began asserting claims over the entire state.
The recent development gains added significance in light of a Pentagon report (December 23, 2025), which assessed that China may now be placing Arunachal Pradesh within the category of its “core interests.” Traditionally, China has reserved this term for issues such as Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang -areas it considers non-negotiable and of the highest strategic priority. Labelling an issue as a core interest signals that Beijing is prepared to employ all instruments of national power – diplomatic, economic, and military – to defend its position. Over time, China’s posture on such issues has tended to harden considerably.
Beijing is using this term for Taiwan since 2003, consistently reacting strongly to any perceived external interference. In 2020, the Chinese Embassy in India advised the Indian media not to congratulate Taiwan on its National Day, stressing that there is only one China.
Similarly, Beijing has become increasingly vocal in asserting Tibet and Xinjiang as integral parts of its territory, opposing foreign engagement on these matters. While China had been objecting to India giving shelter to Dalai Lama right since 1959, in recent years it has started stating more vociferously that Tibet falls in the category of its core interests and objects to the Indian leaders meeting the Dalai Lama.
Since 2006, China routinely protests visits by Indian leaders to Arunachal Pradesh. It protested PM Manmohan Singh’s visit in 2008. In 2024, China deplored PM Modi’s visit to inaugurate the strategic Sela Tunnel, citing it as a move that “complicates the boundary question”.
This approach needs to be seen in the backdrop of two developments. First, since 1949, China has adopted an expansionist approach in its periphery. Its cartographic aggression has been turned into a tool for China’s high-voltage propaganda of its claims in its periphery as a first step for China’s expansion (the Chinese Dream). Later, it surreptitiously tries to change the ground facts in baby steps in its favour, and to finally claim the region.
After occupying Tibet, China not only forced out the Dalai Lama and his supporters but also occupied the Indian territory in eastern Ladakh and clandestinely constructed a highway in the region. The Indian response was to accept that, and this whetted the appetite of China for further expansion. It did not accept the Jonson-Ardagh line. Now it is also not accepting the Macartney–Macdonald Line, which it had informally accepted until 1959. Subsequently, China occupied Lingzi-tang Plains to the west of this line. However, at that time, they left the Chip Chap Valley and the Galwan Valley. After the 1962 war, China changed the LAC, which included these two areas in its claims, and began to push westwards beyond Samzungling and Khurnak Fort. In addition, the Chinese intruders (PLA) often destroy Indian bunkers.
Since 2006, Beijing has started claiming the entire Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. This was preceded by the 2005 agreement, which was implemented only in violation. While in 2020, Beijing tried to use force to occupy the Galwan Valley, on December 9, 2022, the Chinese troops tried to enter the Indian territory in Twang in Arunachal Pradesh. The Indian troops, responding firmly, forced them back on both occasions. In the latter incident, minor injuries on both sides were caused but no fatalities. These incidents underscore the continuing risk of confrontation, though both sides have avoided large-scale escalation.
Second, China’s 2022 land border law introduces a more structured and institutional framework for border management. The law emphasizes safeguarding territorial integrity, strengthening border infrastructure, and enhancing coordination between civilian and military authorities. It empowers central authorities, including the Central Military Commission, to direct border defense and manage contingencies. Importantly, it also promotes the development of border villages and infrastructure, reflecting a strategy that integrates security with socio-economic development in frontier regions.
These developments have serious implications. While India and China continue to engage in dialogue mechanisms to manage the boundary dispute, the scope for flexibility may be narrowing. Increased troop deployments, infrastructure expansion, and the establishment of border villages on the Chinese side point to a more entrenched posture. This, in turn, raises the likelihood of friction and accidental clashes along the LAC.
In this evolving context, India faces the challenge of preventing any unilateral alteration of the status quo. Routine diplomatic protests against measures such as renaming may be necessary but insufficient on their own. There is a growing need to shape both domestic and international narratives more effectively, ensuring that India’s position is clearly articulated and understood. The Chinese narrative should be effectively countered and this aspect must be given utmost priority.
India must carefully calibrate its broader strategic approach. Issues such as Tibet, Taiwan, and the Indo-Pacific framework can influence the wider geopolitical environment, but they also carry risks of escalation if handled without caution. A balanced strategy, combining diplomatic engagement, military preparedness, infrastructure development, and strategic communication, is essential.
Ultimately, the India-China boundary question is likely to remain a long-term challenge. Managing it will require sustained attention, clear signalling, and a comprehensive approach that safeguards national interests while minimising the risk of unintended escalation.
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