Kamal Ghorui
Kargil – 1999, was the first major conflict the Indian Armed Forces fought since the victory of 1971, when Bangladesh was liberated. 1971 was an unquestionably overwhelming victory. However, the euphoria of victory often disallows the right lessons to be learnt. It was in Kargil, a relentless bloody contest to regain ground across snow clad mountains, inch by inch, that the Indian forces learnt a lot more. Amongst the seminal recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee report are its flagging the necessity of jointness and integration of the three services – Army, Navy, and Air Force.
Put together, the Indian armed forces have a total of 17 Commands. Seven each are of the Army and the Air Force and the balance three – Navy. Post the Kargil experience only two joint commands have been raised. These include the Andaman Nicobar Command raised in 2001, and the Strategic Forces Command raised in 2003, that has a very different function. Our nuclear assets are under this command.
The Indian government took a substantive step to energise theaterisation of our forces by the appointment of Gen Vipin Rawat as the first Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) in January 2020. Along with appointment of the CDS, the government also carved out a Department of Military Affairs (DMA). The CDS was to be supported by the Integrated Defence Staff. One of the major tasks of the CDS was jointness and integration of the services, which boils down to the creation of integrated theatre commands and function specific joint commands.
When viewed objectively, the six years that Gen Bipin Rawat and the current incumbent Gen Anil Chauhan have together been at the helm, is barely adequate to put in place a structure that will achieve the objectives of maximising capability, optimising force application and economising to get the best bang for the buck. Further, the three services have not necessarily been on the same page always. The Air Force has often offered options in variance with its sister services.
By 2025, the DMA had been able to finalise the structures of certain organisations and doctrines that would be essential to go ahead with theaterisation. These include formulation of the joint doctrines for Cyber Space operations and Amphibious operations. Other doctrines on employment of Special Forces, Airborne and Heliborne operations, Integrated Logistics, Military Space Operations and Multi Domain operations are being drafted.
The Defence Space Agency, Defence Cyber Agency and Armed Forces Special Operations Division have been created. However, the theatre commands are yet to take shape.
The fundamental conceptual premise of the Theatre Command model is the separation of force generation and force application. Force generation, to include the aspects of raise, train and sustain would remain the responsibility of respective chiefs of the three services. Theatre Commanders will be responsible for all operational aspects and report to the CDS, directly. Among the theatre commands, the Maritime Command will be led by a Naval officer, while the Northern and Southern Command will have either an Army or Air Force officer in the lead. A post of VCDS will be created and take on certain functions of the CDS like procurement, capability development, and a few other aspects to leave the CDS free to attend to operational issues. Theatre commanders and the VCDS will also hold four-star ranks.
Regarding the architecture of theatre commands, quite a few models have been considered. Apparently, there would be two integrated theatre commands along our land borders; one each spanning the length of our borders with China, and Pakistan. There will be a Maritime command covering the entire coastline. In addition, there would be joint commands to manage certain major functions like logistics, training and Information Warfare.
Lucknow and Jaipur could be the locations for the Northern and Western Commands, while the Maritime Command is likely to be at Thiruvananthapuram.
One of the reasons for delay in implementation has been a lack of congruence between the three services, with the Air Force not quite aligned in favour of integration. There is a certain logic to the Air Force’s stance, of course. With the IAF’s huge deficiencies in squadron strength and the possibility of further depletion before the slide can be reversed, the IAF will prefer to employ its resources centrally. However, in the recently concluded Ran Samwad seminar in Lucknow, the CDS, while acknowledging the fact of some differences still existing, informed that discussions on the issues have concluded and he would be forwarding his report to the government within a week, or so. The Cabinet Committee for Security, Chaired by the Prime Minister, will need to review the recommendations of the CDS and approve these for implementation.
If we have to optimise application of our forces in a battlefield environment transiting from being network-centric to data-centric to intelligentized warfare,
we need seamless integration of our forces. To be able to fight in multi-domain operations, capabilities have to be merged to achieve decision superiority. Not only is a transition to Theatre Command concept mandatory, but with technologies progressing, the requirement to restructure the armed forces needs to be continuously assessed.
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