Kamal Ghorui
Bangladesh’s foreign minister Khalilur Rahman is visiting Delhi on 7th April for his first high-level engagement with India.
His visit could be considered as an agenda-setter for prospective official visit of Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahaman to India.
Bangladesh’s foreign minister Khalilur Rahman
Khalilur’s appointment as foreign minister in the newly formed cabinet of Tarique stood out as Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) had earlier demanded his resignation as the National Security Advisor in the Muhammad Yunus’s interim administration.
In the past, Khalilur has closely worked with American policy circles as special Advisor at UNCTAD. Here, appointing a technocrat instead of ideologue could be BNP’s attempt to pursue a multi-directional foreign policy.
In fact, he visited New Delhi in November 2025 to meet India’s NSA Ajit Doval, maintaining contact while political channels between the two countries were halted. His tilt towards Beijing was evident as he pursued a China-Bangladesh-Pakistan Trilateral Mechanism at Kunming in June 2025.
He also allowed intelligence officials of Pakistan to visit Dhaka in January 2025. Thus, his appointment as foreign minister signals a strategic logic that someone having open channels with Washington, China and New Delhi could be an asset in time of diplomatic reset.
At this juncture, his visit to Delhi is a pivotal moment that could move beyond estrangement infused by the Yunus period.
On the other side, Prime Minister Narendra Modi was one of the first to congratulate Tarique Rahman. India has also sent a high-level delegation to his swearing-in ceremony and the intelligence channels are quietly being opened up. Just weeks after new government, Major General Mohammad Kaisar Rashid Chaudhary, the Military Intelligence Chief of Bangladesh, visited New Delhi.
Both sides reached an understanding that neither country’s territory would be used by elements ‘inimical to the other’. In March 2026, when Bangladesh faced fuel shortages, India delivered five thousand tonnes of diesel through India-Bangladesh friendship pipeline. These incidents are reflective of the bilateral relationship cautiously moving toward a structured re-arrangement.
In fact, India is focussing on the continuation of energy exports and representing as a development partner in BBIN region.
Projects that are integral to India’s North-eastern states and its Act East policy, will also be its priorities for India. During Sheikh Hasina’s tenure, Delhi had developed a stable security partnership with Dhaka based on coordination between counter-terrorism units, intelligence sharing, and dismantling of militant and insurgence groups.
During Yunus, loose remarks were made about India’s ‘seven sisters’ being landlocked, Bangladesh becoming the ‘guardian of the ocean’ and ‘extension of the Chinese economy’.
Which were considered unnecessary and insensitive by India. India is also sensitive about growing influence of extra-regional powers including Pakistan in BBIN region. India’s expectations are very clear to this government and considers that a stable government will bring peace, trade and security in the region.
Bangladesh is also expecting high from these visits. On the border issue, Dhaka wants better coordination between the forces and more restraint specially shootings by the BSF during incidents of smuggling or illegal crossings; and also joint actions against cross-border crime through patrols and intelligence sharing.
This issue also entangles with India’s push-in policy, as India deported over 2,196 individuals into Bangladesh between May and August 2025.
On the issue of resource sharing, Bangladesh wants a formal agreement on Teesta water that gives it a larger share of dry-season in northern Bangladesh.
Dhaka is expecting to receive about 37.5% of the Teesta’s flow. Due to federal structure, Indian government has its own limitations. That is why the Teesta agreement could not be signed during Hasina and the chances now also appear bleak.
On the Ganga water, Bangladesh sees the 1996 Treaty as one of the most successful parts of the relationship. The agreement was signed by then Hasina government and even the BNP government (while in power from 2001-2006) despite its usual critical stance did not renounce the treaty.
The thirty-years treaty will expire in December 2026, so Dhaka will have to resolve whether to extend it or ask for some amendment. The treaty has a guarantee of minimum dry-season flows, a more or less 50-50 sharing formula, and the principle of equity, fair play and no harm coming to either party.
Now, Bangladesh may expect more accurate joint monitoring of water released at Farakka, regular data sharing, and new provisions to deal with climate change.
Thus, its renewal faces two challenges. Internationally, political changes in Bangladesh have weakened cooperative bilateralism while India has signalled its preference for a shorter treaty term.
Domestically, more water needs in Northern West Bengal and constraints due to federal politics in India.
Thus, for the bilateral beneficialism, a multi-scalar framework is required to navigate the complexity. At macro-level, there should be regular summit meetings, political dialogue, avoiding hostile public statements and progress on major issues including development and security.
At the Meso level, the relationship should not limit about institution-to-institution; people-to-people contacts through civil society and think tank dialogues will be crucial to over come growing trust deficit. At the micro level, the relationship depends on public opinion and social contact.
The biggest issue is the ‘anti-India feeling’ inside Bangladesh and recently grown ‘anti-Bangladesh feeling’ in India. Both India and Bangladesh have to make a conscious efforts to rebuild the trust though public diplomacy.
The Bangladesh government can respond by acting firmly against attacks on minorities. Both the countries can encourage balanced media coverage, expanding student, media and cultural exchanges with direct contact between ordinary people on both sides.
A stable political order in Bangladesh will bring more investment, trade, employment, social harmony and greater confidence among neighbours.
Therefore, coming visit of Bangladesh’s foreign minister is important.
This visit has the potential to move toward a structural framework of political alternation.
At this junction, it becomes important for India to offer credible alternatives and make its presence functionally indispensable.
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