Kamal Ghorui
For years, the debate around the Indian Air Force has been dominated by a single number—42. That is the sanctioned strength of fighter squadrons, against an existing level of roughly 30–31. It is an important gap, but it has also overshadowed a more fundamental question: even if the numbers improve, how far and how effectively can those aircraft actually operate?
Because modern air power is not just about platforms. It is about persistence, reach, and awareness. And this is where the real constraints begin to show.
Consider aerial refuelling. India currently operates a small fleet of IL (Ilyushin)-78 mid-air refuelers—fewer than a double-digit number of aircraft in total. Each of these can support only a limited number of fighters per mission, depending on distance and payload. In practical terms, this means that extended-range strike or combat air patrol missions can be sustained only in limited numbers at any given time.
Here is a detail that rarely enters public discussion: a single tanker cannot support an entire strike package for deep missions. Depending on the profile, multiple refuelling brackets may be required—both outbound and inbound. This quickly multiplies the demand for tankers. In a high-intensity scenario, tanker availability becomes a bottleneck long before fighter availability does.
There is also a geographical reality. From central Indian bases to potential operational zones in the northern sector or deep maritime regions, fighters may need to cover distances of 1,500–2,000 kilometres or more. Without refuelling, even advanced aircraft are forced into tighter mission envelopes, either carrying extra fuel at the cost of weapons payload or limiting their time over target.
Then there is the question of airborne early warning. India operates a mix of AWACS and AEW&C platforms, including systems mounted on large aircraft and smaller indigenous platforms. Combined numbers remain in the single digits for high-end AWACS and a handful more for AEW&C.
This creates a simple operational challenge: coverage gaps. An AWACS aircraft can monitor airspace hundreds of kilometres wide, but it cannot be everywhere at once. Sustained coverage requires rotation—one on station, one returning, one preparing. In effect, maintaining continuous surveillance over even a single sector requires multiple aircraft. Extending that across two fronts or maritime zones stretches the system further.
Another underreported fact: AWACS are among the highest-value targets in any conflict. Their large radar signatures and critical role make them priority targets. This means they must operate at safer distances, sometimes reducing their effective coverage, or be protected by dedicated fighter escorts—further increasing the demand on available assets.
ISR—Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance—adds another layer to this gap. While satellites and ground-based radars contribute significantly, airborne ISR platforms provide flexibility and real-time adaptability. India has expanded its use of UAVs and surveillance aircraft, but integration across systems—air, space, and ground—remains a work in progress.
A small but telling detail: data latency and fusion speed can decide outcomes in modern air combat. It is not just about collecting information but also about how quickly it can be processed, shared, and acted upon. Without seamless integration, accurate data loses value.
These gaps become more pronounced when viewed against the possibility of a two-front scenario. Deploying fighters across both western and northern sectors is one challenge. Supporting them with tankers, AWACS, and ISR assets simultaneously is another. These are not easily divisible resources. Prioritisation becomes inevitable.
Globally, air forces have already internalised this shift. The United States operates hundreds of aerial refuelers and a large fleet of AWACS to sustain global operations. China has been steadily expanding its tanker fleet and airborne early warning systems, recognising that reach and awareness are central to modern warfare.
India’s efforts, while steady, have been more incremental. Indigenous AEW&C programmes have made progress, and proposals for additional tankers have been revisited over the years. But acquisition cycles, cost considerations, and competing priorities have slowed expansion.
Meanwhile, fighter acquisitions continue to dominate the narrative. They are visible, easier to quantify, and politically salient. Force multipliers, by contrast, operate quietly. Yet, they determine whether those fighters can achieve their full potential.
There is also a doctrinal shift underway—one that is not fully reflected in public discourse. Air power is moving from platform-centric to network-centric operations. The effectiveness of a fighter is increasingly tied to the network it is part of—its ability to receive targeting data, share situational awareness, and operate as part of a coordinated system.
In such a system, tankers extend reach, AWACS extend vision, and ISR extends understanding. Without them, even the most advanced aircraft operate in isolation. Ultimately, the question is not whether India needs more fighters—it does. But that alone will not define air superiority. Because in modern air warfare, dominance is not decided by how many aircraft take off. It is decided by how long they can stay airborne, how far they can go, and how clearly they can see.
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