Kamal Ghorui
For 40 days, the world witnessed a large-scale war between the Israel–US coalition and Iran. Now, a temporary ceasefire has been announced which will give room for talks. This conflict is not just a simple military confrontation. It is part of a broader reshaping of the balance of power in West Asia. Like in the 19th century, Iran has again become a center of competition among major powers. Therefore, a clear end is difficult to imagine in the short term.
Israel and the United States focused on an air campaign to weaken Iran’s military capabilities, as well as its energy and economic infrastructure. Their goal has been to reduce Iran’s offensive power so that it does not pose a threat to Israel anymore. While they might be preparing for next steps, including a ground war, there are currently no clear signs that they are ready for such a major escalation. Starting a ground war could lead to unpredictable consequences. Given Iran’s large geography and long borders, such a war could easily turn into a long and exhausting conflict.
Iran’s behaviour, especially its effort to reach a ceasefire, shows that it is trying to keep the conflict at its current level. It will use this pause to rebuild parts of its command structure and replace lost military assets. The government has a clear interest in continuing the ceasefire, especially if it leads to economic concessions and geopolitical advantages for Iran. Iran has used geo-economic tools extensively—like blocking the Strait of Hormuz or targeting regional energy infrastructure—to increase the global economic cost of the war and thus create pressure to stop it. The Iranian government understands well that a ground war could lead to a more organized and armed opposition, especially in areas like Kurdistan where there is strong political organization. This is crucial at a time when the system’s political legitimacy is under serious pressure. For now, the state’s security forces still have the ability to suppress internal protests with force. But this could change when internal and external crises happen at the same time.
Since February 28, more than 160 missile and drone attacks were carried out on the headquarters of Iranian Kurdish parties in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The attacks by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its proxy forces killed five Kurdish Peshmerga fighters. These Kurdish parties are the most organized and cohesive part of Iran’s opposition. The recent formation of an alliance between six major Kurdish parties has significantly increased their political, military, and diplomatic capacity.
Iran has suffered heavy damage. The destruction of Iran’s military, energy, and economic capacities has left the country facing years of reconstruction and possible economic dependency. In such a situation, the United States could influence Iran’s political future through tools like international financial institutions. The country will therefore definitely not return to its pre-war position. Iran may again become an arena of competition for global powers, with the US in the south, Russia in the north, and maybe China in the east. The Persian Gulf islands and the Strait of Hormuz will be especially important in this context.
For now, a regime change seems unlikely. From the perspective of the Iranian people, this war does not represent their interests or historical demands. The main issue for the people will be rebuilding and managing a large, diverse, and multi-ethnic society. This responsibility lies with the people of Iran themselves. The political, social, and organizational experience of Iranian Kurds will be indispensable in this process. However, if the war ends and the government feels victorious on the external front, serious threats to social freedoms inside the country might emerge.
After the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement in 2022, Iranian Kurds—with their organized political parties, active social networks, and long history of struggle—have played a leading role in pushing for democracy and decentralization. The new alliance of six Kurdish parties can be seen as a strategic effort to improve coordination and achieve more effectiveness. This alliance, together with the social support of the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, indicates a political and social convergence in Iran. This is important not only for dealing with the many crises caused by war, but also for moving toward a democratic political system. Yet, if a stable ceasefire is reached, Kurdish society and its parties may become a main target of the Iranian government.
For Iran’s future, the experience of the Kurds and other progressive civil organizations shows that having organized, forward-looking, and politically coherent forces is crucial. The outcome of Iran’s internal developments will depend mainly on whether these forces can stay united and deepen cooperation with other social movements. The inclusive “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement has the potential to bring together ethnic, civil, and democratic demands through political alliances. Even after the war, such alliances could help open the path toward democratic change based on the legitimate demands of the people.
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