Kamal Ghorui
Pakistan has taken centre stage in global geopolitics in recent days, having emerged as one of a small number of countries directly mediating between the US and Iran. This may come as a surprise to some observers, given that it has an alliance with Saudi Arabia, is bogged down in a conflict with Afghanistan, and has little experience interceding in complex conflicts.But in fact, Pakistan is well-placed to play the role of mediator. It’s one of the few countries to enjoy warm ties with Washington and decent relations with Tehran. Over the last year, it leveraged these relations to hold a series of high-level engagements with each capital—including last summer, during an earlier Iran-Israel conflict. This marks a remarkable change from just two years ago, when its ties with the US were shaky, and it had recently fought a brief war with Iran. In recent months, President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio have praised Pakistan for its knowledge about and willingness to mediate on Iran, and Iran has refrained from carrying out strikes in Pakistan during the war. These are indications of an American and Iranian comfort level with Islamabad.Additionally, Pakistan—perhaps more than any other country outside West Asia—has serious skin in the game. It borders Iran to the east, making it especially vulnerable to conflict spillover risks. Its massive dependence on West Asian hydrocarbons has left it perilously close to running out of liquefied natural gas. Additionally, Pakistan badly wants to avoid invoking its defence pact with Riyadh as it doesn’t want to be dragged into the war. For these reasons, Pakistan had a strong incentive to proactively pitch itself—publicly and privately—as a viable mediator rather than sitting back and being asked to play that role.In contrast, New Delhi’s ties with Washington, while improved in recent months, remain uncertain. Its relations with Tehran are friendly but shaky. The Chabahar port project, one of the few substantive achievements for India-Iran relations since India dramatically decreased its imports of Iranian energy, is in trouble. The US sinking of an Iranian ship that had participated in Indian naval exercises hasn’t helped, either. Perhaps most importantly, India has a rapidly growing relationship with Israel. The optics and timing of PM Modi’s visit to Israel, just before the start of the Iran war, likely didn’t go down well in Tehran either.Regardless of what becomes of Pakistan’s mediation, Islamabad has already strengthened its global diplomatic profile. It’s also earned a strategic advantage by signalling the clout it enjoys in West Asia—a region more important to Pakistan’s interests than any other, given that it’s the source of critical energy imports, home to several million Pakistani expatriates, and the site of some of its closest allies.Some observers may take a zero-sum approach to India-Pakistan rivalry and argue that Pakistan’s gains are India’s loss. But this misrepresents the state of play. First, there’s no reason to believe India has angled to be a mediator. Even if it had an interest in playing such a role, its cautious approach to diplomacy suggests it wouldn’t do so unless formally requested by the warring parties. Second, Pakistan’s mediation efforts may fizzle out as quickly as they picked up and not extend beyond the role of go-between that Islamabad has played to this point. Given the mistrust factor, there are good reasons to believe there won’t be face-to-face talks between US and Iranian officials anytime soon. Failed talks would take Pakistan out of the global limelight.Additionally, Pakistan’s extended geopolitical moment in the sun hasn’t diminished India’s own global standing, including in West Asia, where—like Pakistan—India has some of its closest friends, large numbers of expatriates, and important economic stakes. Furthermore, if the region becomes less conflicted, India will play a major part in a new and emerging geoeconomic architecture spearheaded by initiatives like the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor and the I2U2 Group. It will also benefit from any future enlargement of the Abraham Accords. Pakistan, which has no formal ties with Israel and is unlikely to join the Accords anytime soon, will not.Ultimately, India has a strong interest in the war winding down because of current concerns about deleterious conflict impacts (such as energy shortages and threats to Indian nationals in the region), but also because of future post-conflict opportunities. In this regard, efforts by Pakistan or any other mediator to move the needle toward de-escalation—an outcome admittedly difficult to achieve at the moment—would represent a net positive for India’s interests.Kugelman is senior fellow for South Asia at the Atlantic Council
